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COMMENTS
CRIMINALIZING "VIRTUAL" CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
UNDER THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION
ACT: IS IT REALLY WHAT IT "APPEARS TO BE?"
David is 11 years old.
He weighs 60 pounds.
He is 4 feet, 6 inches tall.
He has brown hair.
His love is real.
But he is not.
-Advertisement for Steven Spielberg's June 2001 film,
Artificial Intelligence.'
Years after his death, John Wayne sells beer in television
commercials. 2 Eons after their extinction, lifelike dinosaurs con-
tinue to terrorize actors and thrill moviegoers.3 The highest-
grossing film of all time4 employs "virtual" passengers aboard the
1. AL. Artificial Intelligence, at http:/aimovie.warnerbros.com (last visited Apr. 3,
2001).
2. Robert Lemos, Virtual Actors: Cheaper, Better, Faster Than Humans?, ZDNET
NEWS, June 15, available at 1998, 1998 WL 28812578 ("John Wayne and Fred Astaire, or
at least the computer-enhanced images of the deceased stars, are starring in commer-
cials.").
3. Mick LaSalle, It's Been a Monster Movie Season This Summer: High-Quality Ac-
tion Thrillers Helped Bring in the Crowds, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 30, 1993, at El ("Computer
graphics continue to become an increasingly integral part of the movie-making process,
and nowhere was this more apparent or impressive than in the summer's biggest hit, 'Ju-
rassic Park.'"). The third installment in the "Jurassic Park" series, Jurassic Park III, is
scheduled for release in the summer of 2001. The Mummy, the Apes and More Magic, USA
TODAY, Feb. 23, 2001, at 1E.
4. Claudia Eller, Meet the King of the World at Fox, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, at C1.
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Titanic, worrying some members of the Screen Actors Guild.5 All
of these feats have been accomplished using sophisticated com-
puter graphics software that blurs the distinction between imagi-
nation and reality.6 This manipulative digital power has raised
concerns about such things as "digital kidnapping," the unau-
thorized misuse of digital images.' For example, such digital mis-
use could include, as intellectual property professor Joseph Beard
notes, "'a star showing up in a porn flick that they hadn't in-
tended to make."'8 In this digital age, however, such photographic
manipulation is no longer reserved for the major Hollywood stu-
dios. Practically any home-computer user can create photorealis-
tic images that are virtually indistinguishable from actual photo-
graphs.9 The potential for misuse of this technology is obvious.
Pornography often acts as a catalyst for the widespread accep-
tance of a new technology.'" Just as it encouraged the widespread
adoption of the VCR in the 1980s," so too have many millions of
people found their way onto the Internet."2 As computers became
faster, more powerful, and cheaper, pedophiles also quickly dis-
covered cyberspace (and the benefit of its anonymity) to be a
thriving marketplace for child pornography. 3 Furthermore, "[n]ot
Titanic grossed $1.8 billion worldwide. Top Grossing Movies of All Time, at
http'//us.imdb.com/Charts/worldtopmovies (last visited Feb. 27, 2001).
5. Lemos, supra note 2 ("The industry is worried over the use, and misuse, of digital
representations of actors, everything from photos on the Internet to 3-D full-body models
that, in the computer world at least, allow the actor to be cloned.").
6. Id.
7. Bruce Haring, Digitally Created Actors: Death Becomes Them, USA TODAY, June
24, 1998, at 8D.
8. Id. (quoting Joseph Beard, an intellectual-property professor at St. John's Univer-
sity).
9. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 15 (1996) ("[A1ll that is required to produce child pornog-
raphy is an IBM-compatible personal computer with Windows 3.1 or Windows 95, or an
Apple MacIntosh computer.").
10. Eric Schlosser, The Business of Pornography, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 10,
1997, at 42, 49 ("In much the same way that hard-core films on videocassette were largely
responsible for the rapid introduction of the VCR, porn on CD-ROM and on the Internet
has hastened acceptance of the new technologies.").
11. Rentals of hard-core pornography on video rose from 75 million in 1985 to 490
million in 1992 and to 665 million in 1996. Id. at 43-44.
12. Kelly M. Doherty, Comment, www.obscenity.com: An Analysis of Obscenity and
Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REV. 259, 262 (1999). In the late 1960s,
the Department of Defense created the Internet to provide a decentralized communica-
tions network for use during nuclear attack. By the 1980s, it had blossomed into a giant
network of networks spanning the globe. Id. at 260.
13. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15 (1996) (statement of Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy
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only have computers facilitated the distribution of child pornog-
raphy, they have also revolutionized its creation." 4 Through the
use of widely available digital-imaging technology, "real" children
are no longer needed to create child pornography." For this rea-
son, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 ("CPPA") 6 to combat the evils of virtual child pornography.
The CPPA, like any legislation, has its critics and proponents.'
This comment examines how the federal appellate courts have re-
solved challenges to Congress's authority to ban virtual child
Assistant Atty Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice); Prepared Testimony of Mary H.
Murguia, Director of Executive Office for U.S. Att'ys, Dept of Justice Before the House
Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice, State and Judici-
ary, Fed. News Service, Mar. 23, 2000, http/web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/form/cong/s.
testimony.html. According to Murguia's testimony:
Child pornographers, who were once limited largely to illicit books, maga-
zines, and mailings, have emerged as a significant problem on the Internet.
This medium has enabled pedophiles to contact each other and strike up
anonymous electronic conversations with or about potential victims. Also, the
Internet provides pedophiles with a means to store, distribute, and exchange
electronic images of child pornography....
... The FBI dedicated 177 agents in FY 1999 to child pornography and
Internet exploitation.
Id.
Consequently, in 1995, more child pornography cases were presented by federal investi-
gative agencies than in any previous year. Id.
14. Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitu-
tional Question, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 439, 440 (1997).
15. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(1)(5), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A
(Supp. IV 1998). The subsection states:
[Niew photographic and computer imaging technologies make it possible to
produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual depictions of what
appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic
images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A.
17. Compare Burke, supra note 14, at 470 (arguing that the state's interests in ban-
ning child pornography that is entirely computer-generated are not compelling enough or
narrowly tailored enough to survive constitutional scrutiny), with Adam J. Wasserman,
Note, Virtual.Child.Porn.Com: Defending the Constitutionality of the Criminalization of
Computer-Generated Child Pornography by the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
-A Reply to Professor Burke and Other Critics, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 245, 247 (1998) (de-
fending the CPPA "against Burke and other critics"), Foster Robberson, 'Virtual' Child
Porn on Net No Less Evil Than Real Thing, ARiz. REPUBLIc, Apr. 28, 2000, at Bl1, and
John Schwartz, New Law Expanding Legal Definition of Child Pornography Draws Fire,
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1996, at A10. At least fifteen constitutional scholars wrote to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee while it was considering the CPPA to express concern about its
ban on what "appears to be" child pornography. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 29 (1996) (addi-
tional views of Sen. Biden).
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pornography under the CPPA. Part I reviews the evolution and
escalation of congressional attempts to regulate child pornogra-
phy since the 1970s as well as the key United States Supreme
Court decisions involving those efforts. Part II discusses the
technological aspects of virtual child pornography and the provi-
sions of the CPPA. Part III surveys, in chronological order, the
four federal appellate court cases challenging the constitutional-
ity of the CPPA. Part IV discusses the appropriate standard of
review for examining the CPPA and argues that the federal ap-
pellate courts should have applied a "balancing of the interests"
test instead of strict scrutiny. In addition, Part IV argues that
child pornography has little or no value as speech.
I. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION SINCE THE 1970s
A. Congressional Efforts to Proscribe Child Pornography
Congress's first step toward protecting children from child por-
nography occurred with the passage of the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.18 This legislation pro-
hibited the use of children under the age of sixteen in making
sexually explicit material to be distributed in interstate com-
merce.' 9 Congress also intended to prohibit the transfer of boys
across state lines for the purposes of prostitution (transporting
girls across state lines was already prohibited).2" However, this
bill only regulated the commercial sale of child pornography, not
the trading of such material, even through the mail.2'
In 1984, Congress passed the Child Protection Act,22 which
went a step further, eliminating the need for a commercial trans-
action and raising the statutory age of a minor to eighteen.23 This
legislation also responded to the Supreme Court's decision in New
18. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423, 2251-53
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
19. Id.
20. S. REP. No. 95-438, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 41.
21. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C. § 2252
(1994); Amy E. Wells, Comment, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides
with the Problem of Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 102 (2000).
22. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1994 & Supp. V 1998)).
23. Id. §§ 4-5; Wells, supra note 21, at 102.
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York v. Ferber24 by eliminating the requirement that child por-
nography be obscene to be criminal.25
Instigated by Attorney General Edwin Meese III's Commission
on Pornography Report,26 which called for tough federal enforce-
ment of obscenity and child pornography laws,2" Congress contin-
ued to pass legislation to fight child pornography.28 The next piece
of child pornography legislation, the Child Sexual Abuse and
Pornography Act of 1986,29 banned child pornography advertis-
ing.3 ° In the same session, Congress also provided legislation
subjecting those who use children to produce pornography to per-
sonal injury liability."
Finally, the first law concerned with the nexus between com-
puters and child pornography came in 1988, with passage of the
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act, 2 which prohib-
ited the use of computers to distribute child pornography.33 The
CPPA is the next significant step in addressing the power of com-
puters to supply the child-porn market.
24. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (granting states greater leeway in regulating child pornogra-
phy than they had under strict adherence to the test established for obscenity in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)); see infra Part I.B.1.
25. Child Protection Act of 1984 § 4; Michael J. Eng, Note, Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno: Has the Ninth Circuit Given Child Pornographers a New Tool to Exploit Children?,
35 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 111 n.14 (2000); Wells, supra note 21, at 102-03.
26. FiNAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986).
27. Id. at 77-79.
28. Schlosser, supra note 10, at 43. The ensuing crackdown on pornography continued
through the presidency of George H.W. Bush and resulted in the conviction of hundreds of
retailers, producers, and distributors. Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
30. Id. § 2; Eng, supra note 25, at 111 n.14; Wells, supra note 21, at 103.
31. Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
32. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251A-
2252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
33. Id. § 7511; Eng, supra note 25, at 111 n.14.
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B. Child Pornography and the Judiciary
1. New York v. Ferber
The first child pornography case, New York v. Ferber,34 came
before the Supreme Court in 1982. In Ferber, a bookstore owner
was convicted, under state law, of promoting the sexual perform-
ance of a child under the age of sixteen after he sold two films of
boys masturbating to an undercover police officer.35 The New
York Court of Appeals, in reversing the conviction, held that the
state statute violated the First Amendment.36 Because adult sex-
ual material could only be regulated if it was deemed obscene un-
der Miller v. California,3" the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to determine whether the New York legislature could prop-
erly prohibit the dissemination of child pornography even if the
material was not obscene under the Miller test.
38
The Supreme Court, in unanimously upholding the New York
statute, recognized that "[s]tates are entitled to greater leeway in
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children."39 The Court
gave five reasons for justifying this greater leeway.40 First, the
Court recognized that a state has a compelling interest in "'safe-
guarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor,'"'"
and that preventing the sexual exploitation of children is of "sur-
passing importance."42 Second, children sexually exploited in this
manner are abused by the production of a permanent record that
34. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
35. Id. at 751-52.
36. Id. at 752.
37. 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("[O]bscene material is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment."). Under the Miller test, in order to determine whether material is obscene, and
thus without First Amendment protection, the trier of fact must determine:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient in-
terest... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) (internal citations omitted).
38. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753 (1982).
39. Id. at 756.
40. Id. at 756-64.
41. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
42. Id. at 757.
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forces them to "go through life knowing that the recording is cir-
culating within the mass distribution system for child pornogra-
phy."' Third, advertising and selling child pornography encour-
ages the market for such materials, and thus the continuation of
activity that is "illegal throughout the Nation."" Fourth, the so-
cial value of such live performances and photographic reproduc-
tions is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."45 Finally, the
Court noted that earlier precedent did not preclude the recogni-
tion of child pornography as a category of material without First
Amendment protection.4" The Court also ruled that the statute
was not substantially overbroad."
Additionally, the Court clearly stated that the child pornogra-
phy test is distinctly different than the Miller test for obscenity.4"
With respect to child pornography, "[a] trier of fact need not find
that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done
so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need
not be considered as a whole."49 According to the Court, First
Amendment protection still remained for works "not otherwise
obscene" that depict sexual conduct "which do[es] not involve live
performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live
performances."" This statement by the Court is perhaps most
relevant to computer imaging,5' and has been seized upon by
those critical of banning computer-generated child pornography.52
43. Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting David P. Shourlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of
Children:'A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 535, 545 (1981)).
44. Id. at 761.
45. Id. at 762.
46. Id. at 763.
47. Id. at 773. The Supreme Court has recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is
"strong medicine" and is employed "only as a last resort." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 613 (1973). It is not novel that a law should not be stricken for overbreadth unless it
reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771.
W[M'Whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the
fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied." Id. at 773-74
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16).
48. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 765.
51. See Vincent Lodato, Note, Computer-Generated Child Pornography--Exposing
Prejudice in Our First Amendment Jurisprudence?, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1328, 1335
(1998).
52. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 29 (1996) (additional views of Sen. Biden, citing written
testimony of Frederick Schauer, Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at Har-
vard University's Kennedy School of Government and a visiting professor of law at Har-
2001]
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The Ferber Court applied a "balance of competing interests"
test in reviewing the New York statute at issue. 3 Clearly, the
Court focused its attention on the harm to minors engaged in the
production of sexually explicit material.54
2. Osborne v. Ohio
The susceptibility of child pornography to state regulation be-
came more apparent in the Supreme Court's decision in Osborne
v. Ohio." Petitioner Osborne, having been convicted of possessing
four photographs of a nude male adolescent, challenged Ohio's
right to proscribe his mere possession of child pornography." Os-
borne based his argument on the Court's decision in Stanley v.
Georgia,57 which struck down a state statute prohibiting the pri-
vate possession of obscene material." The Court distinguished
Stanley on the grounds that the "interests underlying child por-
nography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the
Georgia law."59
Ohio put forth three justifications for banning the possession of
child pornography. First, the state wished to destroy the market
for such materials, and concluded that decreasing the demand
would consequently lower the production.6" Second, as noted in
Ferber, the victims of child pornography suffer continued harm by
the indefinite existence of the sexually explicit materials at is-
sue.61 Finally, Ohio intended to force the destruction of child por-
nography and thus limit the amount of material available for pe-
vard Law School); Wasserman, supra note 17, at 265.
53. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 ("When a definable class of material, such as that covered
by [the statute], bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amend-
ment.").
54. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43; Burke, supra note 14, at 446.
55. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
56. Id. at 107.
57. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
58. Id. at 564-68.
59. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109. In Stanley, Georgia had asserted that the possession of
obscenity would "poison the minds of its viewers." 394 U.S. at 565.
60. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10 ("[W]e cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out
this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.").
61. Id. at 111; see supra text accompanying note 43. Ohio hoped to encourage the de-
struction of such materials. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
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dophiles to use for the seduction of other children.62 Given the
weight of Ohio's interests, the Court ruled that the state could
constitutionally forbid the possession of child pornography.63
In accepting Ohio's compelling interests, the Court executed a
subtle yet important shift, particularly with regard to virtual
pornography. Whereas the first two justifications continue Fer-
ber's focus on the children who are exploited as actual subjects of
the material, the final justification rests on the potential for harm
to other children who may be seduced into exploitation or abuse.64
The Court further rejected Osborne's overbreadth objections, con-
cluding that the Ohio statute would not apply to mere nudity be-
cause it required "a lewd exhibition or involve[d] a graphic focus
on the genitals."65
II. ADVANCES IN DIGITAL IMAGING AND THE CPPA
A. Computer-Generated Child Pornography
Advances in computer technology, specifically the convergence
of photo-imaging technology and home computers, have drasti-
cally improved the ease with which child pornography can be
manufactured. Some photo-editing programs are available for as
little as $50, though the higher-end software such as Adobe
Photoshop costs around $600.66 According to the Senate report ac-
companying the CPPA, these technologies allow individuals to
produce "visual depictions of children engaging in sexually ex-
plicit conduct which are virtually indistinguishable to an unsus-
pecting viewer from unretouched photographs of actual minors
engaging in such conduct.""7
62. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
63. Id. The Court noted that a scienter element was still required for a conviction un-
der the Ohio statute. Id. at 123.
64. Wasserman, supra note 17, at 254.
65. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 113.
66. Robert Benincasa, Computer Tricks Fuel Child Pornography: Software Makes it
Easy to Exploit Kids, Raises Free Speech Concerns, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 29, 1999, at A3.
The lower cost of video equipment has also increased the supply of hard-core pornographic
movies. Schlosser, supra note 10, at 45. Only about 100 hard-core feature films were pro-
duced in 1978, with a typical cost of about $350,000. Id. In 1996, about 8,000 films were
produced, and some cost only a few thousand dollars to produce. Id.
67. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 8 (1996).
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There are two categories of computer-generated pornography-
computer-altered and virtual.6" "Virtual" child pornography does
not involve the depiction of an actual, "identifiable minor."69 Be-
cause the children depicted do not actually exist, the image is
completely "virtual." ° Computer-altered child pornography, on
the other hand, incorporates an actual minor in some way.7 In
such instances, computers are used to alter innocent pictures of
actual children, taken from magazines, videos, catalogs, and the
like by digitally removing clothing and arranging the children
into sexually-provocative positions. 2 Employing a technique
known as "morphing," even pictures of adults can be transformed
digitally into pictures of children." All of these techniques allow
producers to custom-tailor images to the proclivities of the pedo-
phile-consumer. 4
Prior to the enactment of the CPPA, these advances in com-
puter-imaging technology rendered federal law impotent in sev-
eral ways. 5 First, because the law only covered pornography in-
volving actual children, it created a loophole for computer-
generated pornography. 6 Second, if prosecutors were forced to
prove during child pornography prosecutions that the children
depicted in photos were indeed real children, reasonable doubt
would be "built-in" to every "kiddie-porn" prosecution."
68. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1098 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting); Eng, supra note 25, at 111. Up to this point, the term "virtual" has been
used to encompass both forms of computer generated child pornography. This will con-
tinue throughout this Comment unless a distinction is necessary, at which point it will
either be referred to as "virtual" or "computer-altered."
69. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1098 n.1 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 15.
73. Burke, supra note 14, at 440-41 & n.5.
74. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 16.
75. Eng, supra note 25, at 112.
76. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 18 ("[The CPPA] will close this computer-generated loop-
hole in Federal child exploitation laws .... ").
77. Id. at 16. In fact, in the first federal trial involving the importation of child por-
nography by computer, United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995), the de-
fense attempted such a strategy. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S.
1237 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 17-18 (1996) (statement of
Kevin Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice); S.
REP. No. 104-358, at 16-17.
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B. The CPPA
Congress enacted thirteen legislative findings into law with the
CPPA.78 Congress recognized that advances in computer technol-
ogy made it possible to create depictions of what "appear to be"
actual children engaging in sexually exploitative conduct.79 In ad-
dition, Congress found that computer-altered pornography that
contains images of recognizable children affects their reputation
for years.8" Perhaps most significant, Congress concluded that no
distinction existed between using "virtual" or "real" pornography
to seduce and molest children.8 For these reasons and others,
Congress enacted the CPPA "to attack the rise of computerized or
'virtual' child pornography." 2
The CPPA accomplished this attack by amending 18 U.S.C. §
2256 to include:
(8) "child pornography" means any visual depiction, including
any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer, or computer-
generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where-
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified
to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, de-
scribed, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engag-
ing in sexually explicit conduct. s3
The "appears to be" language in subsection (8)(B) refers to child
78. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1), 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-26 to -27 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (Supp. IV 1998) (Congres-
sional Findings)).
79. Id. § 121(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-26.
80. Id.
81 Id. § 121(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-27. "Child molesters and pedophiles use child por-
nography to convince potential victims that the depicted sexual activity is a normal prac-
tice; that other children regularly participate in sexual activities with adults or peers." S.
REP. No. 104-358, at 13-14.
82. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1999).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
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pornography that is entirely virtual--"portray[ing] no actual liv-
ing child."8 4 Subsection (8)(C) addresses computer-altered pornog-
raphy." Subsection (8)(D) prohibits producers or distributors
from even presenting material as depicting child pornography.86
Under the statute, an "identifiable minor" only needs to be some-
one who was a minor at the time the image was created or whose
image as a minor was used in its creation. 7 This part of the stat-
ute covers, for instance, replacing the face of an adult engaged in
sexual conduct with the face of a real child. 8
In addition to the definitional changes in section 2256, the
CPPA also inserted section 2252A. 9 This companion statute to
section 2252, which criminalizes "the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct,"9" maintains the same prohibitions,
substituting the term "child pornography," in order to prohibit
virtual child pornography using the new definition of that term as
found in section 2256."' Section 2252A also includes an affirma-
tive defense that exempts everyone, except possessors (i.e. pro-
ducers and distributors), if they can show that actual adults were
used to produce the material and that it was not advertised as
containing minors.92 It is also an affirmative defense to possession
of child pornography that the defendant "possessed less than
three images of child pornography" and took action to destroy the
material or reported the matter to the police.9
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CPPA: THE CIRCUITS Go
THREE TO ONE
A. United States v. Hilton94
The first challenge to the constitutionality of the CPPA in fed-
eral court began with the indictment of David Hilton for criminal
84. Wasserman, supra note 17, at 248.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (Supp. IV 1998).
86. See id. § 2256(8)(D).
87. Id. § 2256(8)(C).
88. Wasserman, supra note 17, at 249.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. IV 1998).
90. Id. § 2252(a)(1)(A) (1994).
91. Id. § 2252A (Supp. IV 1998); see Wasserman, supra note 17, at 249.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
93. Id. § 2252A(d)(1).
94. 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
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possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B).95 Hilton challenged the statute on constitutional
grounds, and the United States District Court for the District of
Maine accepted his vagueness and overbreadth claims.96 The
court also found the CPPA to be a content-neutral regulation,
only enacted to combat the secondary effects of child pornogra-
phy. The court made no examination of the severability clause
Congress enacted with the statute.9" Rejecting the court's analy-
sis, however, a three-judge panel of the First Circuit unanimously
reversed the district court's decision, declaring the CPPA consti-
tutional.99
The First Circuit, in Hilton, determined that the CPPA is not
content-neutral as the district court had held, finding instead
that the statute "is a quintessential content-specific statute."'
The court's analytical framework relied on the "greater leeway"
accorded to the government in Ferber,'°' as well as Osborne's rec-
ognition of government interests beyond the protection of children
who appear in sexually explicit materials.0 2 With these precepts
in mind, the court turned to Hilton's overbreadth and vagueness
challenges. 10 3
Prior to reaching the overbreadth claim at issue, the court
noted several reasons why the judiciary must be hesitant to
strike down a statute as overbroad."0 4 While describing the "ap-
pears to be" language of the statute as "troublesome,"0 5 the court
95. Id. at 67.
96. United States v. Hilton, 999 F. Supp. 131, 136-37 (1998).
97. Id. at 134.
98. See id.
99. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 65.
100. Id. at 69.
101 Id. at 70 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982)).
102. Id. at 69-71. Among the secondary compelling interests the court noted from Os-
borne were the elimination of the "record of abuse of real children" and the use of such ma-
terials to seduce children into sexual activity. Id. at 70.
103. Id. at 71.
104. Id. at 70. Recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" that is
only to be used as a last resort, the court reviewed several considerations against employ-
ing the doctrine. Id. at 71 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769). First, facial invalidation of a
statute has far-reaching effects. Id. Second, a few "problematic prosecutions under the
law" can be outweighed by the likely number of lawful applications. Id. Finally, relying on
hypothetical situations is less reliable than case-by-case adjudication. Id. (citing Ferber,
458 U.S. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
105. Id. at 71.
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reiterated that, wherever possible, statutes with two interpreta-
tions should be construed to avoid constitutional problems." 6 The
court reasoned that legislative history clearly indicated that Con-
gress meant the "appears to be" language to have a narrow con-
struction-applying only to visual images that can be mistaken
for actual children.0 7 Therefore, the CPPA would not apply to
non-photographic materials depicting sexually explicit poses of
youthful-looking persons.' Eventually the court rejected the
overbreadth claim, even though some "tiny fraction of mate-
rial... could conceivably.., fall within the purview of the
Act ... "109
Finally, the court turned to the defendant's vagueness claim.
According to the court, a statute must "'define the criminal of-
fense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can under-
stand what conduct is prohibited'" or be voided for vagueness." °
Reversing the district court's finding that the "appears to be"
standard is completely subjective, the First Circuit held that, to
the contrary, it is an objective one."' It is up to the jury to exam-
ine the "totality of the circumstances" and to decide "whether a
reasonable unsuspecting viewer would consider the depiction to
be of an actual individual under the age of 18 engaged in sexual
activity."" 2 The court noted that the CPPA has an element of sci-
enter that the prosecution must satisfy in order to overcome its
burden of proving that the defendant "knowingly" possessed the
images at issue."' The court also mentioned that the affirmative
106. Id. at 71-72 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24).
107. Id. at 72. The court quoted the language of Senate Report 104-358, which defines
the narrow class of images as those "which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting
viewers from unretouched photographs of actual children engaging in identical sexual
conduct.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 104-358, at pt. I, IV(B) (1996).
108. Id. The court specifically refers to "drawings, cartoons, sculptures, and paintings."
Id. In fact, the government conceded this point by arguing that these types of materials
would not be a depiction of a "person." Id. at 72 n.7.
109. Id. at 74. The specific exception the court had in mind was youthful adults por-
traying children in "sexually provocative images with redeeming social value." Id.
110. Id. at 75 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 104-358, at pt. IV(C)). Some of the considerations that the
jury may take into account include: (1) the physical appearance of the person depicted; (2)
how the image was marked or identified; (3) the file name in the case of a computer file;
and (4) how the image was advertised or displayed. Id.
113. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV. 1998)).
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defense.. would require the acquittal of someone
who honestly believes that the individual depicted in the image ap-
pears to be 18 years old or older (and is believed by a jury), or...
knew the image was created by having a youthful-looking adult pose
for it... so long as the image was not presented or marketed as if it
contained a real minor.
115
Considering all these factors, the court upheld the statute against
the defendant's vagueness challenge." 6
B. United States v. Acheson" 7
A constitutional challenge almost identical to that found in Hil-
ton made its way to the Eleventh Circuit in November 1999.
Acheson, the defendant, downloaded child pornography off the
Internet using the screen name "Firehawk96."n 8 Acting on infor-
mation from German authorities in September 1996, the United
States Customs Department found out about Firehawk96's activi-
ties."' A little over a year later, the FBI received information that
the defendant was downloading child pornography using America
Online ("AOL"). 20 After linking Firehawk96 to Acheson, the FBI
seized and searched his computer.' Authorities discovered over
500 sexually explicit images involving minors.'22 Acheson pled
guilty but reserved the right to appeal the constitutionality of the
CPPA. 1
Citing Hilton, the court found the CPPA to be a content-based
restriction." The court then announced that Acheson's facial
114. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
115. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75-76.
116. Id. at 76. The court also considered another element-the lack of alternatives. Id.
("We reject the suggestion that Congress must be confined to addressing pornographic im-
ages of some children, but not others.").
117. 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 648.
119. Id.
120. Id. AOL is the world's largest Internet service provider. America Online Gets the
Message: Go Wireless (Feb. 28, 2000), at http'//-www.cnn.com/2000/TECHIcomputing/02/28/
aol.wireless.
12L Acheson, 195 F.3d at 648.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124 Id. at 650 ("The CPPA is a content-based restriction on speech, as it is the content
of an image of a minor or cyber-minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct that defines its
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challenge was insufficient, given that child pornography is not
protected expression and may be regulated freely. 2 ' Considering
whether the statute was overbroad, the court weighed the
amount of constitutionally protected material swept within the
statute against the material that it legitimately prohibits. 2 6 It
then concluded that "[tihe CPPA's overbreadth is minimal when
viewed in light of its plainly legitimate sweep."'27
Mirroring the First Circuit's analysis, the Acheson court recog-
nized the existence of the affirmative defense and scienter re-
quirement. 2 ' As for Acheson's vagueness claim, the court again
concurred with the standard enunciated in Hilton. 29 Thus, the
court, in a unanimous panel decision, affirmed the lower court's
ruling and held that the CPPA was constitutionally sound. 3 °
C. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno.3'
The next court to consider a challenge to the CPPA was the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike the previous CPPA cases,
this statutory challenge was not precipitated by a defendant
charged under the statute, but instead involved an association of
businesses (hereinafter "Coalition") involved in the production of
"adult-oriented materials."3 2 The Coalition sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, claiming that the statute failed for vague-
ness and overbreadth."3 In a two-to-one decision, the court of ap-
peals overturned the district court, holding that Congress's at-
tempt to criminalize "the generation of images of fictitious
unlawful character.").
125. Id. The court preferred to analyze the constitutional challenges in terms of over-
breadth and vagueness. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. "To the extent it defines 'child pornography' as images of actual minors, the
CPPA passes constitutional muster with room to spare." Id. at 651. "[T]he legitimate
sweep of the CPPA far exceeds the threat of improper applications." Id. at 652.
128. Id. at 651-52.
129. Id. at 652-53; see supra text accompanying note 112.
130. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 648.
131. 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 1086.
133. Id at 1086-87. The Coalition also challenged the CPPA affirmative defense as un-
constitutionally shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Id. at 1087. The Ninth Cir-
cuit did not assess the validity of this claim, however, because it found the statute to be
unconstitutional. Id. at 1090.
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children engaged in imaginary but explicit sexual conduct" vio-
lates the First Amendment.13 4
The district court had ruled that the CPPA was content-neutral
because Congress intended to combat the deleterious secondary
effects of child pornography, particularly "the exploitation and
degradation of children."35 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
First Circuit's conclusion in Hilton that the CPPA intends to pro-
scribe expression based on its content.'36 The court then noted
that "[w]hen a statute restricts speech by its content, it is pre-
sumptively unconstitutional" and "the government must establish
a compelling interest that is served by the statute, and it must
show that the CPPA is narrowly tailored to fulfill that interest." 137
The court, relying on Ferber, determined that "Congress has no
compelling interest in regulating sexually explicit materials that
do not contain visual images of actual children."3 The court
analogized the CPPA's restrictions to the city of Indianapolis's at-
tempted ban on pornography that depicted women in degrading
or submissive situations because it would reduce "'the tendency of
men to view women as sexual objects.., that leads to both unac-
ceptable attitudes and discrimination in the workplace and vio-
lence away from it. '" 39 However, the critical link in the court's
analysis was the absence of studies verifying the connection be-
tween virtual child pornography and the subsequent abuse of ac-
tual minors. 4 ° Even though the court acknowledged that images
134. Id. at 1086. The district court had ruled that the statute was content-neutral and
was neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Id.
135. Id. at 1090.
136. Id. at 1090-91.
137. Id. at 1091.
138. Id. at 1092. The court identified three compelling reasons for proscribing child
pornography containing actual children: (1) the harm to the children used in the produc-
tion of the images; (2) whetting the appetites of pedophiles encourages the sexual abuse of
children; and (3) that the images themselves are morally repugnant. Id. at 1091-92. The
Ninth Circuit interprets Ferber to mean that only the protection of the actual children
used to produce child pornography can justify its regulation. Id. at 1092. This interpreta-
tion, while perhaps accurate, overlooks the fact that neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court had any reason to be concerned with the use of computers to digitally create lifelike
"virtual" pornography-a capability that did not exist at the time Ferber was decided. The
court also ignores the recognition of secondary interests expressed in Osborne.
139. Id. at 1093 (quoting Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir.
1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)).
140. Id. at 1094. It is difficult to see how the presence of such studies would have al-
tered the court's decision, as the majority previously stated in their opinion that "any vic-
timization of children that may arise from pedophiles' sexual responses to pornography
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of virtual child pornography may be morally repugnant, it deter-
mined that, absent a nexus between computer-generated pornog-
raphy and harm to real children, the CPPA could not stand.14 '
Turning to the vagueness challenge, the Ninth Circuit took is-
sue with the Hilton court's determination that the "appears to be"
and "conveys the impression" standards are objective ones. 4 2 In-
stead, the Free Speech Coalition court concluded that such lan-
guage was "highly subjective" " and did not "'give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited.""' In addition, the failure to provide a specific stan-
dard to those in charge of enforcing the CPPA risks arbitrary ap-
plication of the statute.1
45
As for appellants' overbreadth claim, the Free Speech Coalition
majority held that the CPPA encompasses an unacceptable
amount of material protected by the First Amendment because it
includes in its scope depictions that are completely virtual.46
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit deemed the statute overbroad. 47
In dissent, Judge Ferguson strenuously objected to the major-
ity's conclusions and articulated five reasons why Congress may,
without violating the Constitution, proscribe computer-generated
pornography."4 First, though Ferber focused on the effects that
child pornography has on the actual participant, Osborne clearly
relied on the harm caused to other children when child pornogra-
phy is used to coerce or seduce them into sexual acts. 149 Second,
the Supreme Court has also recognized that Congress has a le-
gitimate interest in destroying the market for child pornogra-
phy 5 ° Third, the majority failed to consider some of Congress's
other justifications for the statute, such as the prosecutorial diffi-
apparently depicting children engaging in explicit sexual activity is not a sufficiently com-
pelling justification for CPPA's speech restrictions." Id. at 1093. But see Eng, supra note
25, at 126-27.
141. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1094.
142. Id. at 1095.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1096.
147. Id. ("The CPPA's inclusion of constitutionally protected activity as well as legiti-
mately prohibited activity makes it overbroad.").
148. Id. at 1097-1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1098-99.
150. Id. at 1099.
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culty involved in establishing that the subject of an image is an
actual child.151 Fourth, child pornography of either type, virtual or
real, "has little or no social value."52 Finally, the majority im-
properly used a strict-scrutiny approach to analyze the CPPA in-
stead of "balancing the competing interests," as the Supreme
Court did in Ferber and Osborne.53
With respect to the overbreadth challenge, Judge Ferguson re-
ferred to the legislative history of the CPPA in concluding that
"everyday artistic expressions like paintings, drawings, and
sculptures that depict youthful looking subjects in a sexual man-
ner" will not be criminalized because Congress clearly intended
the CPPA to cover only computerized visual depictions that are
"virtually indistinguishable" from images of actual children.5 In
light of Congress's intent, Judge Ferguson reasoned that the
CPPA is not overbroad.'55 As for the claim of vagueness, Judge
Ferguson found it "unlikely that a person of ordinary intelligence
would be unable to determine what activities are prohibited."'56
The jury could use an objective standard, such as the one ex-
pressed in Hilton,'57 to evaluate the age of the individual de-
picted. 58
D. United States v. Mento
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Mento,' 59 became the most recent circuit to examine the constitu-
tionality of the CPPA and the third federal appellate court to is-
sue a unanimous panel decision upholding its constitutionality. 6 '
In December 1997, the FBI, acting on a tip, searched the defen-
151. Id. at 1100.
152. Id. ("Why should virtual child pornography be treated differently than real child
pornography? Is it more valued speech? I do not think so.").
153. Id. at 1101 ("Since the balance of competing interests tips in favor of the govern-
ment, virtual child pornography should join the ranks of real child pornography as a class
of speech outside the protection of the First Amendment.").
154. Id. at 1101-02.
155. Id. at 1102.
156. Id. at 1103.
157. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
158. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1103 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
159. 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
160. See id.; United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999).
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dant's home and seized "more than one hundred images of naked,
prepubescent children in sexually explicit situations." 6' The de-
fendant pled guilty in the district court, but reserved the right to
appeal the constitutionality of the CPPA.'62
The Fourth Circuit, acknowledging the three prior circuit court
decisions,'163 determined that the CPPA is a content-based restric-
tion on speech requiring strict-scrutiny review." Invoking Os-
borne, the court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized
such government interests in combating child pornography as
shutting down the distribution network, eliminating child por-
nography from the marketplace, and keeping pedophiles from
using it to coerce or seduce other minors.'65 The court also identi-
fied six purposes for the act as defined by other courts and com-
mentators. 66 In response to the defendant's claim that Ferber
limited the government's interests to the protection of actual
children, 67 the court explained that Ferber was decided long be-
fore computer-generated pornography became a problem. 68 The
court stated that the government's interest in protecting all chil-
dren from the sexual exploitation resulting from child pornogra-
161. Mento, 231 F.3d at 915. Information on one of the images indicated the child was
five years old. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 916-17.
164. Id. at 918 ("Limitations imposed on speech because of its content are therefore
subject to strict scrutiny, that is, no such limitation is valid unless it is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest.") (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 918-19. Those interests identified by the court are:
(1) to prevent the use of virtual child pornography to stimulate the sexual
appetites of pedophiles and child sexual abusers;
(2) to destroy the network and market for child pornography;
(3) to prevent the use of pornographic depictions of children in the seduction
or coercion of other children into sexual activity;
(4) to solve the problem of prosecution in those cases where the government
cannot call as a witness or otherwise identify the child involved to establish
his/her age;
(5) to prevent harm to actual children involved, where child pornography
serves as a lasting record of their abuse; and
(6) to prevent harm to children caused by the sexualization and eroticization
of minors in child pornography.
Id. (citing Hilton, 167 F.3d at 66-67; Burke, supra note 14, at 452).
167. Mento, 231 F.3d at 919.
168. Id.
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phy-not just children used in its production-is compelling.'6 9
Because the "connection between virtual child pornography and
the sexual abuse of children is as powerful as the causal link that
justifies the utter prohibition of pornographic images involving
actual child participants,"'7 ° and the statute is the least restric-
tive regulatory means, the court held that the Act survives consti-
tutional scrutiny. 7 '
The court agreed with the Hilton court that the CPPA does not
cover cartoons, paintings, or drawings, but "only those images
that are virtually indistinguishable from previously banned pho-
tographic depictions."' 2 The CPPA is not overbroad because it re-
stricts no more speech than is necessary to effectuate the gov-
ernment's interest in proscribing child pornography.' 3
As for the defendant's vagueness challenge, because the CPPA
adequately lists the elements of the offense, provides an affirma-
tive defense to those charged, requires the prosecution to estab-
lish scienter, and focuses only on depictions that are practically
indistinguishable from photographic images, the requisite consti-
tutional specificity exists. 74 Therefore, the court held that the
CPPA withstands First Amendment review.' 7
IV. ANALYsIs AND DIscusSION
A. To Strictly Scrutinize or Balance the Compelling Interests:
Doesn't Anyone Have Standards Anymore?
Even a casual glance at the four circuit court cases that have
thus far reviewed the constitutionality of the CPPA makes one
thing perfectly clear: the courts are just as confused as commen-
tators about what standard of review to apply to virtual child
pornography.176 Three of the circuit courts that have addressed
169. Id. at 920.
170. Id.
17L Id. at 921.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 922.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 923.
176. See Burke, supra note 14, at 459 ("It is altogether possible that the Ferber Court
created child pornography as a separate category of unprotected expression."); Gary
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the CPPA have properly upheld its constitutionality. However, in
some cases, these courts have reached the proper conclusion us-
ing an incorrect standard, and in the Ninth Circuit's case, the
wrong conclusion using the wrong standard. As the dissent in
Free Speech Coalition v. Reno noted, the CPPA should not be
evaluated under strict scrutiny-instead, it warrants the applica-
tion of the balancing test as applied by the Supreme Court in
Ferber and Osborne.1
7
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any law
"abridging the freedom of speech." 178 However, this right to free
speech is not absolute. Over the years the Supreme Court has
carved out specific areas of speech that are not afforded First
Amendment protection. 179 Typically, "[a] 'content-based' restric-
tion on speech is subject to strict scrutiny review."180 However,
the Court has generally not subjected sexually explicit materials
to strict-scrutiny review.18 There are two reasons why the circuit
courts that have subjected the CPPA to strict-scrutiny review
have done so incorrectly. First, child pornography is speech with
little, if any, social value. Second, the Ferber and Osborne Courts
applied a balancing test weighing "the state's interest in regu-
lating child pornography against the material's limited social
value." 8 2
Geating, Obscenity and Other Unprotected Speech: Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 389, 397-99 (1998) (concluding that as a content-based restriction,
the CPPA must undergo strict scrutiny review); Eng, supra note 25, at 123-24 ("[The
Ninth Circuit should have evaluated the CPPA under the balancing approach suggested
by the Supreme Court in Ferber and Osborne, rather than applying the strict scrutiny
standard of review."); Lodato, supra note 51, at 1335 ("Ferber held child pornography to be
unprotected speech under the First Amendment .... ."); Wasserman, supra note 17, at
256-62 (analyzing Professor Schauer's four paths toward non-protection under the First
Amendment, and concluding that "Ferber and Osborne draw from each of the paths toward
nonprotection to declare child pornography unprotected ... ." Id. at 259).
177. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1101 (1999) (Ferguson, J., dissent-
ing).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
179. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libel); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words). Professor Frederick Schauer has developed what he calls the four "paths"
of nonprotection. For a discussion of these paths, see Frederick Schauer, Codifying the
First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285 (1982). For a discussion of
the four paths in the context of the CPPA, see Wasserman, supra note 17, at 256-61.
180. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
181. Wasserman, supra note 17, at 257.
182. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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1. Child Pornography, Virtual or Real, Has Little or No Value as
Speech and Has Little or No First Amendment Protection
Obscenity lies outside the bounds of First Amendment protec-
tion." "'[Implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance.'"" However, in Stanley v. Georgia,'85 the Supreme Court
prohibited a state from proscribing the mere possession of ob-
scene materials. 86 In Ferber, the Court upheld this very same
proscription-the mere possession of child pornography-because
the "value of permitting... photographic reproductions of chil-
dren engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not
de minimis."8 7
Furthermore, the test for child pornography enunciated in Fer-
ber employs a substantially less stringent standard than the
Miller formulation for obscenity.18 Not only can one conclude that
child pornography clearly receives considerably less protection
under the First Amendment than obscenity, the Ferber decision
also indicates that child pornography categorically rests outside
the First Amendment's protections. 89 This assessment amounts
to an "a priori" determination that child pornography holds less
183. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85.
184. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484).
185. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
186. Id. at 568.
187. United States v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982).
188. Id. at 764-65 ("A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the pruri-
ent interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done
so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole.").
189. Id. at 763 ("Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of mate-
rial outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier
decisions."). At least one commentator believes this statement by the court is a red her-
ring. See Wasserman, supra note 17, at 260 ('This suggestion is deceiving. Courts in non-
coverage cases typically do not examine a state's justification for restricting speech: if the
speech is not covered by the First Amendment, then there is no reason to consider why the
state desires to regulate it."). It is difficult to read the Court's statement as merely a pro-
jection of what the Court could do. A common interpretation of this statement indicates
that it is meant to reflect what the court is doing-declaring child pornography outside the
First Amendment umbrella. It is perfectly understandable for the Ferber Court to evaluate
the state's reasons for regulating child pornography, as this is the evidence used to sup-
port the proposition that it falls outside the First Amendment. Having no precedent by
which to evaluate the proper status of child pornography, the court could hardly be ex-
pected to simply declare it out of bounds without an inquiry into the legitimate reasons for
doing so.
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value than other forms of speech. The only question is whether
the "virtual" nature of computer-generated child pornography is
enough to force open the First Amendment's protective umbrella.
Considering the following rationales for banning "virtual" child
pornography, it is not.
a. Permitting Virtual Child Pornography Would Mean No
Prosecutions for Actual Child Pornography
Permitting virtual child pornography while proscribing actual
child pornography would place an insurmountable burden upon
prosecutors. If prosecutors in child pornography cases are forced
to prove that the children are real and not computer-generated,
"'there could be a built-in reasonable doubt argument in every
child exploitation/pornography prosecution."" 90 In fact, as Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory noted in his com-
ments during the CPPA congressional hearings, the United
States faced just such a prosecutorial problem during a 1993 child
pornography case,' 9' at a time when the imaging capabilities of
everyday home computers were far inferior to those capabilities
today.' 92 This threat is real. Describing his situation as "really
hamstrung,"'1 3 a Virginia prosecutor plea bargained a ninety-one
count indictment down to five counts when he could not prove the
images in question depicted actual children.' 94 The Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly, like other state legislatures, has recently intro-
duced legislation to ban computer-generated child pornography.' 95
The legal existence of virtual child pornography would make
prosecuting those using "real" children an almost insurmountable
task."'96 The combination of "hamstrung" prosecutors and the re-
190. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 16 (1996) (quoting written testimony of Bruce A. Taylor,
President and Chief Counsel of the National Law Center for Children and Families).
191. United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995).
192. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17-18. Luckily, cross-examination combined with produc-
tion of some of the original magazines containing the scanned images at issue helped se-
cure the conviction. Id.
193. Ron Scherer, Computer-Created Child Pornography Stymies Police, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2001, at 2.
194. Id.
195. H.D. 2586, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001). Similar bans have been en-
acted by Vermont and Missouri, and legislation is pending in Arizona and New Mexico.
Scherer, supra note 193, at 2.
196. Dan Armagh, a former state prosecutor who now works for the National Center
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sultant decline in child pornography prosecutions would likely re-
sult in a renewed increase in the use of actual children in sexu-
ally explicit images, yet again thwarting Congress's legitimate at-
tempt to destroy the child pornography market, 9 ' and rendering
Ferber and Osborne legally impotent.
b. Child Victims Can Be Seduced/Coerced by Virtual
Pornography
Virtual pornography is just as useful a tool as depictions of ac-
tual children for the coercion and seduction of other children.
Through the extensive testimony of child pornography experts,
Congress found that child molesters could use computer-
generated depictions of child sexual activity to break down inhibi-
tions to sexual conduct just as effectively as pictures of real chil-
dren.9 ' In many ways, virtual pornography can be even more
dangerous. A pedophile can coerce children into performing sex-
ual acts by altering innocent pictures of those children into im-
ages of them engaging in sexually explicit conduct.'99 Further-
more, it can be easier to seduce a child into performing sexual
acts if innocent pictures of that child's friends have been ma-
nipulated to depict them engaging in sexual acts."' Additionally,
the Osborne Court endorsed the legitimacy of the effort to protect
children other than those depicted in the images.2 '
It can hardly be contemplated that the First Amendment
grants states wide leeway to combat the injurious effects of "ac-
tual" child pornography while simultaneously safeguarding the
identical evils of "virtual" child pornography.
for Missing and Exploited Children believes that "[tihis could cause an incredible burden
on the prosecutors who investigate crimes against children." Scherer, supra note 193, at 2.
197. This interest is expressed in the Congressional Findings supporting the CPPA,
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(12), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-27 (1996), and validated by the Supreme Court in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
110-11 (1990).
198. Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121(7)-(9).
199. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 15-16 (1996).
200. Id. at 16.
201. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
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2. Only a "Balancing of the Interests" is Required
The Ferber and Osborne Courts did not use strict scrutiny to
evaluate the statutes at issue. In fact, the term "strict scrutiny"
does not appear in either case.2 °2 Instead, as the Court in Ferber
noted:
it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been
accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so over-
whelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that
no case-by-case adjudication is required. When a definable class of
material, such as that covered by [the N.Y. child pornography stat-
ute], bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children en-
gaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests
is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materials
as without the protection of the First Amendment.
20 3
Although the Court here refers to the children "engaged in
[child pornography's] production,"204 it is important to note that
the issue of virtual pornography was not before the Court, nor
was it even a technical possibility at the time of the decision. Fur-
thermore, the Court went so far as to recognize that "a work
which, taken on the whole, contains serious literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value may nevertheless embody the hardest
core of child pornography."2 5 The assertion seems to be that even
these types of works would survive the Miller obscenity standard,
and therefore the test for child pornography should be relaxed-
hardly the type of concession a court would make in a strict-
scrutiny case.
Judge Ferguson summarized the Osborne balancing test in his
Free Speech Coalition dissent-"the 'gravity of the State's inter-
ests' outweighed Osborne's limited First Amendment right to pos-
sess child pornography."2 6 By assessing child pornography laws
using a balancing approach, and in light of the low speech value
of child pornography, the Supreme Court makes it clear that
202. See Osborne, 495 U.S. 103; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
203. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
204. Id. at 764.
205. Id. at 761.
206. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111).
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Congress has wide latitude in regulating child pornography.0 7
The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, in Acheson and Mento re-
spectively, upheld the CPPA, clearly using "strict scrutiny" analy-
sis.2"" These courts deemed the government's interest in banning
virtual child pornography compelling and in addressing the de-
fendant's overbreadth claims found the respective statutes suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored. Although the balancing approach dis-
cussed above could have, and should have, been applied by these
courts, surviving strict scrutiny review means that the CPPA
would survive constitutional muster under the less stringent
"balancing of the interests" standard with room to spare.
In Hilton, the First Circuit did not expressly use a strict-
scrutiny analysis or a balancing approach, focusing instead on the
defendant's overbreadth and vagueness claims.2 9 However, an
examination of the court's decision indicates the majority's incli-
nation toward the balancing test. Specifically, the court recog-
nized that Ferber "carved out an entire category of speech 'which,
like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment,' 21 0 and
that legislatures have "greater leeway" in regulating child por-
nography.21
1
Of the four primary cases discussed in this comment, it is the
Ninth Circuit's Free Speech Coalition decision that most com-
pletely misses the mark. The court used the wrong standard to
come to the wrong conclusion. 212 The court used strict-scrutiny
analysis 213 to strike down the statute, finding that Congress
lacked a compelling interest in regulating child pornography that
does not contain visual depictions involving real minors. 14
207. See Eng, supra note 25, at 130.
208. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that con-
tent-based restrictions require strict scrutiny review); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d
645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that child pornography, like obscenity, libel, and
fighting words, is one type of unprotected speech and requiring the government to provide
a compelling interest and a narrowly drawn statute).
209. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 71 (1st Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 69 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982)).
211. Id. at 70 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756).
212. For a more thorough discussion of the infirmaties in the Free Speech Coalition de-
cision, see Eng, supra note 25.
213. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1091 (Tlo survive the constitutional inquiry
the government must establish a compelling interest that is served by the statute, and it
must show that the CPPA is narrowly tailored to filfill that interest.").
214. Id. at 1092.
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There are several problems with the Ninth Circuit's rationale.
Citing a law review article, the court flatly stated that "[flactual
studies that establish the link between computer-generated child
pornography and the subsequent sexual abuse of children appar-
ently do not yet exist."15 The court concluded that, "[albsent this
nexus,-16 the CPPA is unconstitutional.1 The implication in the
court's statement is that the existence of such studies would be
enough to overcome strict-scrutiny review. However, this directly
contradicts the court's earlier assertion that "any victimization of
children that may arise from pedophiles' sexual responses to por-
nography apparently depicting children engaging in explicit sex-
ual activity is not a sufficiently compelling justification for
CPPA's speech restrictions."21 This suggests that, at least as far
as the Ninth Circuit is concerned, harm to actual children is the
only compelling interest Congress may successfully advance un-
der strict-scrutiny review. This conclusion clearly contradicts the
Supreme Court's ruling in Osborne which validated Congress's
attack on the "secondary" effects of child pornography.219
The Ninth Circuit should have employed the balancing ap-
proach, weighing the low value of child pornography against Con-
gress's interest in banning virtual child pornography.220 Further-
more, the short shrift given to Congress's justifications
improperly substituted the court's determination of the facts for
that of Congress, which is far better equipped to handle that role.
This point was not overlooked in the government's petition for
writ of certiorari where, citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC,22 ' the appellants note that "[tlhe court of appeals had no
basis for disregarding that congressional judgment."222
In United States v. Pearl,23 the District Court for the District
of Utah also criticized the Free Speech Coalition court for sup-
215. Id. at 1093 (citing Ronald W. Adelman, The Constitutionality of Congressional Ef-
forts to Ban Computer-Generated Child Pornography: A First Amendment Assessment of S.
1237, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 483, 488, 490 (1996)).
216. Id. at 1094.
217. Id. at 1093-94.
218. Id. at 1093.
219. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
220. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
221. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
222. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16 n. 2, Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d
1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 00-795).
223. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Utah 2000).
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planting Congress's views with its own:2 24 "[in reviewing the con-
stitutionality of a statute, 'courts must accord substantial defer-
ence to the predictive judgments of Congress.' 225
V. CONCLUSION
Computers will continue to blur the distinctions between real-
ity and fiction. Congress's first significant foray into "virtual
crime," the Child Pornography Prevention Act, is not only consti-
tutional, but also critical to our social fabric. Prohibiting the dis-
tribution or possession of virtual child pornography, whether
computer-generated or computer-altered, survives scrutiny under
the Supreme Court's decisions in Ferber and Osborne. The evils of
each are the same-victimization, abuse, and sexual exploitation
of children. Legalizing virtual child pornography would effectively
end the government's ability to combat the use of actual children
in pornography-a result that no enlightened society can morally
or ethically tolerate.
Wade T. Anderson
224. Id. at 1239.
225. Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 195).
20011

